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3. AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP LAW 
AGENCY LAW 
Pearlie KOH 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore),  
LLM (University of Melbourne); Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);  
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Apparent authority 
3.1 The important role that agents play in commerce is not 
doubted. However, when transactions are entered into through the 
intermediary of agency, the intended contractual parties are exposed to 
the risk of fraud and dishonesty on the part of the agent. Cavenagh 
Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 was a case involving 
the purported lease of an apartment owned by the plaintiff and 
managed by a managing agent. Both the plaintiff and the managing 
agent were companies controlled by C, who was the sole shareholder 
and director of each company. The wrongdoing agent, R, was an 
employee of the plaintiff ’s managing agent, who, through a number of 
forgeries including the signature on the lease agreement, succeeded in 
leasing the plaintiff ’s apartment to the defendant’s employer for the 
defendant’s occupation. At all times, the defendant dealt only with R 
who had all the keys and access cards to the apartment. R was, however, 
acting on his own accord and without authority. The plaintiff, who had 
no knowledge of the lease until some two years later, claimed against the 
defendant for damages for trespass to land. Clearly, it was crucial for the 
defence to establish that the defendant’s occupation of the premises 
was pursuant to a lease that was valid and binding on the plaintiff. As it 
was common ground that R had no actual authority (at [21]), the 
defendant’s case had to rest on the doctrine of ostensible authority. 
3.2 The elements that must be established before apparent or 
ostensible authority is made out are clear. As the doctrine is premised on 
estoppel, the principal’s representation, that created the appearance of 
authority of an agent, made to the other contracting party, lies at the 
core of the doctrine. It was therefore incumbent on the defendant to 
show that the plaintiff had represented to him that R was authorised to 
enter into the lease on the plaintiff ’s behalf. In this regard, the court 
noted that whilst evidence of the internal workings of the plaintiff ’s 
managing agent (such as whether R was trusted to do certain things, the 
extent of his responsibility, and the distribution of duties amongst the 
employees of the managing agent) would be relevant to establish the 
scope of R’s actual authority (which was in any case untenable, given the 
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forgeries, on the present facts), evidence of this nature was irrelevant to 
the present inquiry as to ostensible authority. Instead, the defendant was 
required to show that in allowing R to act in a certain way, the plaintiff 
had created a state of affairs which amounted to a representation that 
R had the authority to do certain acts. This was a question which must 
be decided on the specific facts of each case. On the present facts, the 
court considered that the only reasonable representation by the plaintiff 
was the act of equipping R with the keys and access cards to the 
plaintiff ’s property. However, this act did not amount to a representation 
that R had the authority to enter into leases on the plaintiff ’s behalf as 
this was commonly done by landlords in Singapore for the purpose of 
conducting viewings for prospective tenants and such like ministerial 
acts. 
3.3 In any case, the evidence showed that the defendant had 
specifically insisted that R obtain, for the lease agreement, the signature 
of C, the sole director of the plaintiff. As the court noted, the defendant 
could not now contend that there had been a representation as to R’s 
authority to enter into the lease on the plaintiff ’s behalf. Even if there 
had been such a representation, the evidence was clear that the 
defendant had not relied on the same. 
3.4 The defendant also sought to rely on the decision of the English 
Court of Appeal of First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International 
Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194 (“First Energy”) to argue that R had 
the ostensible authority to communicate and represent to him the 
plaintiff ’s approval of the lease. In First Energy, the regional manager of 
the defendant bank had made an offer of credit facilities to the plaintiff 
which the latter had accepted. The bank, however, declined to provide 
the finance and the plaintiff sued for breach of contract. Although the 
regional manager did not have the authority to conclude the 
transaction, and this fact was known to the plaintiff, the court found 
that the regional manager had ostensible authority by virtue of his 
position to communicate that head office approval had been given for 
the facilities offered. Evans LJ noted (at 206) that there was “no 
requirement that the authority to communicate decisions should be 
commensurate with the authority to enter into a transaction of the kind 
in question”. This case was considered by our Court of Appeal in 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia 
Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2011] 3 SLR 540 at [59] (see 
further (2011) 12 SAL Ann Rev 48), where it observed as follows: 
A representation as to the principal’s approval of a transaction goes to 
the heart of the agency relationship. While an agent may possess 
authority (whether actual or ostensible) to make general representations 
pertaining to a certain transaction … this authority, in a situation 
where the agent does not also possess authority (whether actual or 
ostensible) to enter into the said transaction on the principal’s behalf, 
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cannot include authority to make the specific representation that the 
principal has approved that transaction. To argue that an agent has 
authority to represent that his principal has approved a transaction – 
which is, in effect, authority to bind the principal to the transaction – 
because he (the agent) has authority to make general representations 
about the transaction and, hence, also has authority to represent that 
his principal has approved the transaction is contrary to the 
established principle that there cannot be self-authorisation by an 
agent. [emphasis in original] 
3.5 The court in the present case applied this narrow reading of the 
decision in First Energy to the facts. Specifically, the court concluded 
that R did not have the ostensible authority to make the specific 
representation that the plaintiff had communicated approval of the 
lease. Further, the fact that the defendant had asked for the signature of 
C meant that the defendant did not believe that R had the necessary 
authority to communicate and represent the plaintiff ’s approval of the 
lease. 
3.6 It was also argued that the plaintiff had, by its failure to react to 
a letter sent by fax and by post by the defendant to the plaintiff ’s 
registered address, ratified the unauthorised acts of R. The letter in 
question would have, had it been received by the plaintiff, notified the 
plaintiff of the defendant’s occupation of the apartment. Whilst the 
court accepted that silence or inactivity was, in an appropriate case, 
capable of amounting to ratification, it noted that the juridical nature of 
ratification dictated that, to have that effect, the silence or action must 
be clearly indicative of the principal’s assent to be bound by the agent’s 
act. In the words of the court (at [31]): 
In essence, ratification is akin to an assent by the principal to the 
transaction entered into by the unauthorised agent by adopting the 
agent’s otherwise unauthorised acts. To this end, the principal’s 
inaction must when interpreted in the context and circumstances, be 
of a nature which unequivocally signifies such an assent. [emphasis in 
original] 
3.7 In the circumstances, there was accordingly no valid lease 
between the parties. 
Consent 
3.8 The basis of an agency relationship is the consent of both the 
principal and the agent. There were a couple of decisions that dealt 
briefly with the concept of consent. In Alwie Handoyo v Tjong Very 
Sumito [2013] 4 SLR 308, the Court of Appeal affirmed the requirement 
for the agent’s consent to act as agent. The case involved transactions for 
the sale and acquisition of shares. A clause in the sale and purchase 
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agreement provided that certain persons were “authorised to receive 
[the agreed consideration] for and on behalf of the [vendor]”. The 
vendor subsequently claimed that the consideration ought to have been 
paid to him directly. It was asserted, inter alia, that the agreed recipients 
were agents for the vendor, and were hence under a duty to account to 
the vendor qua agent. The agency was said to have arisen from the use of 
the phrase “for and on behalf of” in the sale and purchase agreement, 
which phrase constituted the recipients agents for the vendor. 
3.9 The Court of Appeal, disagreeing with the lower court judge, 
considered the mere use of the phrase insufficient to show that the 
recipients had consented to act as agent. It was too tenuous a ground on 
which to found an agency relationship. In any event, as the recipients 
were not themselves parties to the sale and purchase agreement, the 
court opined that any agency relationship between the vendor and the 
recipients would have to be found outside of the agreement. As there 
was simply no unequivocal evidence as to the necessary consent, no 
agency relationship could be said to exist between the parties. 
3.10 In Strategic Worldwide Assets Ltd v Sandz Solutions (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 662, the plaintiff, which held a 25% stake in the 
defendant company, sued for its share of dividends which had been 
declared by the defendant. An issue that was raised was whether one L 
had been made the agent of the plaintiff in connection with the 
acquisition by the plaintiff of shares in the defendant company. L was 
the founder of the defendant company who, at the relevant time, 
controlled 75% of the defendant. The plaintiff was an investment 
company which ultimately came to acquire the remaining 25% of the 
defendant through an arrangement by which this stake was first 
acquired by L, and then transferred by L to the plaintiff. If L was acting 
as agent for the plaintiff in connection with the acquisition of the 25% 
stake, the plaintiff ’s entitlement to the dividends would have arisen at 
the time the stake was transferred to L. On the evidence, the court found 
that whilst various synonyms were used in the parties’ description of 
their relationship, the intention was clearly for L to purchase the 25% 
stake in the defendant as agent on the plaintiff ’s behalf. The court noted, 
citing Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd [1969] 1 AC 552 at 587, 
that whilst agency must derive from consent, it was not necessary for the 
consent to relate to the very relationship of principal and agent, which 
may in fact be denied. The consent may relate to a state of facts upon 
which the law imposes the consequences which result from agency. In 
the present case, almost the entire purchase price had been remitted by a 
law corporation which represented the plaintiff, and L had subsequently 
transferred the subject shares to the plaintiff for no consideration. These 
circumstances sufficed to indicate the parties’ consent to a state of affairs 
which supported an agency relationship between them. 
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Agent holding property for principal 
3.11 When an agent receives property for and on behalf of his 
principal, it is possible for the parties to agree that the property will, the 
moment it comes into the hands of the agent, belong to the latter. This 
was the effect of the agreement between principal and agent under 
consideration in the English Court of Appeal decision of Clarence House 
Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [2009] EWCA 1311: see further 
Peter Watts & F M B Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 19th Ed, 2010) at para 6-041. Much therefore 
depended on the contract between the parties. Where the passing of 
proprietary rights to the agent is the effect of the contract, the agent 
should be entitled to utilise the property (now belonging to him) in any 
manner that he deems fit, including to repay any indebtedness he might 
owe to his principal. This very issue was raised in the High Court 
decision of Ma Ong Kee v Cham Poh Meng [2013] SGHC 144 in the 
context of a claim in debt. 
3.12 The plaintiff, Ma, sought to recover from Cham sums which the 
latter had allegedly borrowed to fund his own business. Cham’s defence 
was that he had repaid the loan out of sums in an account (“margin 
account”) with a bank, which had been opened in his own name. The 
parties had been associated in a business collaboration which involved 
investing in publicly-quoted companies. Some of these investments were 
made through the margin account. When the collaboration ended in 
2007, the account was closed, and the proceeds therefrom were handed 
over to Ma. 
3.13 The court examined the relationship between the parties, and 
concluded that Cham was a “general factotum” (at [27]) to Ma vis-à-vis 
the latter’s investments. The court found that the margin account had 
been opened by Cham at the direction of Ma, who provided all the 
funds therefor, and as his agent: at [54]. As agent for Ma, Cham 
therefore owed a personal fiduciary duty to account to Ma for the 
money that he had received and invested through the margin account. 
Accordingly, the return of the proceeds from the closure of the account 
to Ma was pursuant to Cham’s personal obligation as an agent to 
account to his principal. The payments could not therefore be 
simultaneously a discharge of the debt owed by Cham to Ma, which was 
outside of the agency. 
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BA, LLB (Hons) (Wellington), LLM (Harvard); 
Solicitor (England and Wales), Barrister and Solicitor (New Zealand),  
Member of the New York Bar;  
Associate Professor (Practice),  
School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Existence of partnership 
3.14 An argument that a partnership has arisen is sometimes made 
even where the relationship between the parties more obviously fits into 
another category, eg, main contractor and subcontractor. In Qwik Built-
Tech International Pte Ltd v Acmes-Kings Corp Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 278, 
the plaintiff was in the business of designing and fabricating steel 
framing systems for use in construction. It entered into a contract to 
supply steel framing systems to the defendant which was the contractor 
for a construction project in the Maldives. After supplying the systems, 
the plaintiff claimed the alleged contract price of $1.2m. One of the 
defences put forward by the defendant was that the parties had formed a 
partnership to share equally the profits gained from their participation 
in the Maldives project, and therefore until those profits had been 
determined the plaintiff should only be paid at cost for items actually 
supplied. The only argument made in support of a partnership was that 
the contract, which was partly written and partly oral, provided for 
profit-sharing. In fact, Lionel Yee JC found (at [17]) that there was 
insufficient evidence that a profit-sharing arrangement had actually 
been agreed. However, he also pointed out that, if it had been, the 
defendant could have succeeded on the basis of such agreement – 
whether or not it gave rise to a partnership. While agreed profit-sharing 
is an important indicium of partnership, the two are not the same thing. 
It has always been clear that profit-sharing can exist without 
partnership: see s 2(3) of the Partnership Act (Cap 391, 1994 Rev Ed). 
(The converse proposition, that partnership can exist without profit-
sharing, was recently approved in England: see M Young Legal 
Associates v Zahid [2006] 1 WLR 2562 and Rowlands v Hodson [2009] 
EWCA Civ 1025; and Yee JC also concurred with that view: at [16].) 
A finding of partnership is usually more relevant where the issue is one 
of liability to a third party, in view of the mutual agency between 
partners and their joint liability with each other. Where the dispute is 
only between the parties to the contract, as in the present case, the 
primary issue is the scope of their agreement. As his Honour said 
(at [16]), in that context “the existence or otherwise of a true 
partnership between the parties is largely irrelevant”. 
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3.15 In Guy Neale v Nine Squares Pty Ltd [2013] SGHC 249 
(“Guy Neale”) (which is more fully discussed at para 3.16 below), 
a party to what appeared to be a partnership agreement argued that the 
relationship created by the agreement was a mere “business venture” 
and did not amount to a partnership in law. The alleged reason was that 
the relationship lacked mutuality because the agreement allocated the 
“management and control” of the business to only one of the parties, 
who was given power to transact on behalf of all. Judith Prakash J 
dismissed this argument (at [65]): the ability for partners’ meetings to 
exercise their powers was sufficient indication of the mutual carrying on 
of the business. This is, with respect, correct: a partnership must, by 
definition, carry on business in common – but for this it is not essential 
either that all partners be allowed to take an active part in management 
or that all partners have actual authority to bind the firm. If it were, the 
possibility of “sleeping partners” would not exist. 
Partnership property 
3.16 A dispute over whether a trademark was owned by a 
partnership or by a company owned individually by one of the partners 
was considered by Prakash J in Guy Neale. Although the partnership in 
question was formed under a contract governed by the law of Victoria, 
Australia (at [61]), the similarity of the partnership law of the two 
jurisdictions makes the decision worth mentioning. In 1999, Chondros, 
an Australian, had investigated setting up a restaurant, bar and club in 
Bali and had enlisted the local assistance of Kadek, an Indonesian. The 
restaurant, etc, was to be called “Ku De Ta”, and in January 2000 Kadek 
applied for an Indonesian trademark for that name. In February 2000, 
a partnership agreement (“HoA”) was entered by Chondros, Kadek and 
others in relation to the restaurant. Trademarks for “Ku De Ta” were 
later registered in Australia (2002), Singapore (2004 and 2009) and 
elsewhere in the name of the defendant, a company co-owned by 
Chondros and used by him in managing the Bali restaurant and for 
other purposes. In 2009, the defendant entered into an agreement to 
license the Singapore trademarks to a third party for use in a new 
Singapore restaurant business. In response, the plaintiff partnership 
sought a declaration that the Singapore registered trademarks were held 
on trust for the partnership. Although nominally a plaintiff, Chondros 
opposed the proceedings. 
3.17 The judge first considered an argument that the defendant 
(which was not a partner) held the Singapore marks on an express trust 
for the partnership. However, she rejected this contention on the facts, 
holding that there was no intention to hold those assets on trust 
(at [139]); it is beyond the scope of the present chapter to discuss this 
issue. 
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3.18 The judge then had to determine whether the partnership 
owned the “Ku De Ta” name/trademark generally. If so, the procurement 
by Chondros of the defendant’s registration of the mark in Singapore 
may have been a breach of his partnerial fiduciary duty, resulting in the 
possible imposition of a constructive trust: at [46]. The starting point for 
determining the rights to the name as between the partners was the 
HoA, drafted by Chondros’ lawyer, which did not expressly deal with 
that matter. The agreement contemplated a partnership relating to the 
Bali restaurant, and was expressed to be for a term of 20 years. At the 
expiry of that time, the HoA provided that all rights would vest 
absolutely in the members. Prakash J held that such rights must refer to 
the partnership property, including the name and goodwill of the 
restaurant, which would probably be the only significant assets at expiry. 
Even if Chondros considered himself to be the inventor and owner of 
the name, he could have preserved his rights in the agreement but had 
not done so: at [55]–[56]. Further, it was unlikely that the other partners 
contemplated that the name would belong to Chondros alone, as they 
were contributing the bulk of the capital. It was also a new name, not 
used for any prior business but brought into being for the purpose of 
the envisaged firm. Her Honour distinguished Ratna Ammal v Tan Choo 
Sow [1964] MLJ 399, where a trademark previously owned by one 
partner was held to have remained outside the partnership property. In 
that case, the partner had used the mark in carrying on the business 
alone before bringing in partners: at [57]–[58]. In conclusion, Prakash J 
held that the “Ku De Ta” trademark generally (as distinct from the 
Singapore registrations thereof) was partnership property. The rights to 
the Singapore registrations therefore turned on the issue of breach of 
duty (see below, para 3.19). 
Relationship of partners between themselves 
Fiduciary duties 
3.19 That issues of fiduciary duty and partnership property are often 
inter-twined is illustrated by the same case, Guy Neale (see facts outlined 
at para 3.16 above). The court there went on to consider whether 
Chondros had breached his fiduciary duty to his partners by obtaining, 
for his own company, the Singapore registrations of the partnership’s 
trademark – ie, a usurpation of a partnership opportunity. It was 
accepted that this issue was also governed by the law of Victoria 
(at [145]), on which the court received expert evidence. The experts 
agreed that, under Victoria law, obtaining the Singapore registrations 
would have been a breach of duty only if there had been “a real or 
substantial possibility” of the partnership setting up an operation in 
Singapore at the time of either registration (ie, 2004 or 2009). This 
entailed that expansion to Singapore “would have been a likely activity 
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that the … partnership would have entered into had it appreciated the 
opportunity, or would have moved to in the ordinary course of events”. 
Her Honour concluded that this test had not been satisfied on the 
evidence. In particular, she held (at [176]–[181]) that the fact that 
Chondros (together with the defendant’s co-owner) had since 2005 been 
exploring with third parties the possibility of bringing the Ku De Ta 
concept to Sentosa did not make it an action that the partnership would 
likely have undertaken. Accordingly, Chondros had not breached his 
fiduciary duty and the Singapore registrations were not held on 
constructive trust for the partnership. 
3.20 Two points may be noted in passing. First, Prakash J applied the 
agreed test under Victoria law without commenting on whether it was 
precisely the same one which prevailed in Singapore law. Second, on the 
facts there was no need to consider whether the applicable test for 
diversion of opportunity may be less strict for partners as compared 
with company directors – as is suggested by the English case of 
O’Donnell v Shanahan [2009] EWCA Civ 751. 
Limited liability partnerships 
Liability of partnership and partners to third parties 
3.21 The Singapore Professional Golfers’ Association v Chen Eng Waye 
[2013] 2 SLR 495 (“SPGA v Chen”) is the first case in which the higher 
courts have considered the law of limited liability partnerships (“LLPs”). 
These were introduced into Singapore in 2005 under the Limited 
Liability Partnerships Act (Cap 163A, 2006 Rev Ed) (“LLP Act”). As the 
name suggests, LLPs are a hybrid form of business organisation, 
combining features of partnerships and limited-liability companies. 
Singapore’s version of the LLP draws on both the UK and Delaware 
models as well as the Singapore limited company, which pedigree has 
resulted in an “eclectic mixture”: see Yeo Hwee Ying, “Nature and 
Liability Shield of Limited Liability Partnerships in Singapore” (2007) 
19 SAcLJ 409. 
3.22 SPGA v Chen was a passing-off action brought by the Singapore 
Professional Golfers’ Association (“SPGA”), a registered society formed 
to promote the interests of professional golfers, against an LLP called 
“Singapore Senior PGA LLP” (“SSPGA LLP”) and the latter’s two 
partners, who were a father and son named Chen. The SPGA failed to 
establish passing off in the High Court ([2012] 3 SLR 699), which did 
not therefore discuss the issues relating to LLPs. On appeal by the SPGA, 
however, the Court of Appeal held that liability for passing off had been 
made out. 
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3.23 The interest of the case for the law of LLPs concerns who was 
liable for the tort. SSPGA LLP, despite comprising the legal minimum of 
two partners, was in effect a “one-man” partnership. Chen Senior was 
the moving force behind the business, and had carried out all the acts 
which amounted to the passing off. On the other hand, Chen Junior was 
not involved in the business at all and had only agreed to become a 
partner to fulfil the minimum requirement. The effect of s 8(3) of the 
LLP Act is that a partner remains liable for his own wrongful acts and 
omissions: the court, accordingly allowed the appeal, against Chen 
Senior: at [80]. Under s 8(4), an LLP (which is a separate legal entity) is 
liable to the same extent as a wrongdoing partner for acts done in the 
course of the LLP’s business or with its authority: hence, SSPGA LLP 
was liable, in effect jointly, with Chen Senior: at [70]. However, under 
s 8(2) a partner is not liable solely by reason of being a partner of an 
LLP. Therefore, as an “innocent” partner, Chen Junior was not liable: 
neither vicariously under s 8(2) nor personally under s 8(3): at [79]. 
3.24 The Court of Appeal’s application of the statute is thus entirely 
consistent with its plain wording. Despite its novelty, the case was not a 
hard one on the facts: one partner was wholly responsible for the 
tortious acts while the other was completely innocent. The facts did not 
raise what could have been more difficult issues, such as where an 
otherwise blameless partner had a supervisory role over a wrongdoing 
partner. 
3.25 In the light of s 8(3), there is limited scope for arguing that a 
tortfeasor partner of an LLP is not personally liable where he acted 
purely in the course of his position as such – an argument which in 
some contexts has been accepted in relation to directors of companies: 
see Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830. SPGA v 
Chen is also a reminder that in spite of their name, LLPs are not on all 
fours with limited companies: the liability of members of an LLP can, in 
some circumstances, be unlimited. 
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